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Better rules for sharing water could make a 
large difference for equity and productivity out-
comes. Economic incentives for water mana-
gement, including prices, taxes, subsidies, 
quotas, and use or ownership rights can affect
the decisions of water users and motivate them
to conserve and use water more efficiently.
Von Claudia Ringler
The Potential Role of Economic Instruments in River Basin Management
Increased economic efficiency through
paying farmers to use less water
Water uses and developments in one part of a hydrologic orriver basin will affect outcomes in other parts. Similarly,
pollutants introduced in one part of a river basin will eventual-
ly affect outcomes elsewhere in the system. The often invisible
but strong inter-connection of water users within a river basin
can be seen in multiple (re)uses of water. Water in the Danube
basin, for example, is drunk and used for different productive
and ecosystem activities by 14 riparian countries along its flow
into the Black Sea. The basin context is also important as actu-
al water savings at the basin level might be less than savings at
individual irrigation systems might indicate. For example, in
the Nile basin of Egypt, it has been estimated that while irriga-
tion efficiencies for individual systems are only 30 percent, the
overall irrigation efficiency for Egypt’s Nile irrigation use is 80
percent, as irrigation water is reused several times (Keller 1992).
With growing water demands exerted by increasing and
more affluent populations, efficient, sustainable, and equitable
water allocation policies are rapidly increasing in importance
both in large, transboundary basins but also in smaller catch-
ment areas. In the past, supply augmentation of water through
new water development has been common to address water
shortages experienced in one part of a basin. In so-called matu-
ring water economies, characterized by increasing scarcity va-
lues for water, demand management increases in importance.
Thus, the focus on engineering, technical, and agronomic so-
lutions declines (Randall 1981). The task of demand manage-
ment is to generate both physical savings of water and econo-
mic savings by increasing output per unit of evaporative loss of
water, by reducing water pollution, and by reducing non-bene-
ficial water uses. This can be supported through a variety of po-
licy measures, including economic incentives to conserve wa-
ter use. These measures can comprise pricing reform and
elimination of wasteful subsidies, but also complementary re-
gulations on water use rights, and policies targeting poor and
vulnerable groups, education campaigns, water recycling, en-
hanced pollution monitoring, and quota, licensing, and locale-
specific or basin-wide water trading systems. In addition to wa-
ter conservation, economic incentives can also help recover
investment costs, and can help internalize costs imposed on
third parties and on the environment. And while many demand
management measures have targeted irrigation as the largest
water user, municipal and industrial water use cannot grow un-
checked; regulation and economic incentives are needed to re-
duce the negative ecological, economic, and social impacts of
these uses, especially on water quality.
Modeling Framework Used
The modeling framework used here for analyzing economic
incentives is a combination of hydrologic simulation with eco-
nomic optimization maximizing economic benefits to water use
subject to physical, system control, and policy constraints. The
conceptual and technical basis for this type of integrated basin-
scale modeling is described in a state-of-the-art review by McKin-
ney (1999).
The node-link network, which is an abstracted representa-
tion of the spatial relationships between the physical entities in
the river basin, underlies the modeling system. Nodes represent
river reaches, reservoirs, and water demand sites, and links re-
present the physical linkages between these entities, such as na-
tural and artificial channels, canals and drains. Inflows to the-
se nodes include surface discharge from the headwaters of the
river basin, as well as local rainfall drainage. Flow balances are
calculated for each node and for each time period, and flows are
calculated based on the spatial linkages in the river basin net-
work.
Thematically, the basin model includes three components.
Firstly, hydrologic components, including the water balance in
reservoirs, river reaches, and irrigated cropland; secondly eco-
nomic components, including the calculation of benefits from
water used by sector, demand site, and province and thirdly in-
stitutional rules and economic incentives that impact upon the
hydrologic and economic components. Water supply is determi-
ned through the hydrologic water balance in the river system
and reflects exogenously determined inflows and precipitation
inputs. Water demand is determined endogenously within the
model based on functional relationships between water and pro-
ductivity in irrigated agriculture, domestic and industrial uses,
and hydropower. Water supply and demand are balanced based
on the objective of maximizing economic benefits to water ,
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use. Environmental requirements to dilute waste streams and
to control saltwater intrusion are included as minimum flow
constraints. In addition, reasonable values for minimum flow
are preserved on all river reaches. This modeling framework
thus preserves the hydrologic integrity of a river basin system
while supporting the analysis of tradeoffs and complementari-
ties among alternative water uses, and the impact of alternative
water allocation policies and strategies on these water users.
Analysis of Economic Incentives in a 
River Basin Context
Economic incentives can play a role in many water and wa-
ter-impacting policies, and can include direct water use rights
for environmental flows, payments for environmental services,
such as upstream watershed protection for downstream muni-
cipal water supplies, payments to irrigators to use less water, the
elimination of subsidies for agricultural input and output pri-
ces and the elimination of trade subsidies and non-efficient tra-
ding arrangements, those affecting climate change, and the en-
forcement of water quality regulations.
Economic incentives play out differently under differing
enabling institutions. The most important among these are wa-
ter rights for farmers and other water users to facilitate invest-
ment in water-conserving irrigation technologies, to share both
benefits and responsibilities from water use and create incenti-
ves for cooperation, to increase the reliability and thus reduce
uncertainty and wasteful use, to facilitate compensation of wa-
ter users when water is reallocated from one part of the basin
to another – typically from rural irrigation uses to urban indus-
trial and domestic uses, and to facilitate water rights trading
among users within the river basin.
Other basic enabling institutions that influence the use of
economic incentives include the rule of law and good governan-
ce, for example, through the use of stakeholder negotiation plat-
forms that are increasingly being implemented. Also important
is the relative focus on public systems versus private develop-
ment. The impact of mostly private groundwater expansion in
many developing countries on water availability for other users
and the environment has yet to be addressed. Equally impor-
tant, to alleviate budget constraints and management challen-
ges, several developing country governments have embarked on
decentralization or devolution of management and operational
functions of irrigation systems to the province or district levels
or directly to farmer groups, which can both hinder or enhance
water management.
Water Pricing
Water pricing is the most common economic instrument
used for basin water uses. In a review of the World Bank irriga-
tion and drainage portfolio covering 68 projects water pricing
was most common, with 52 out of 68 projects using it (Dinar,
2001). Administrative water prices generally work well for mu-
nicipal and industrial water usage, particularly if subsidies are
targeted towards poor domestic users, and revenues generated
through water charges are invested into expanding water sup-
ply services to lower-income areas.
Administrative water prices are generally less effective in sa-
ving significant quantities of irrigation water, particularly in de-
veloping countries where farmers have limited control over wa-
ter supply. In these settings supplies are seldom reliable and
large systems serve many small farmers, rendering measuring
devices and monitoring deliveries often too costly. Analyses have
shown that increases in direct water tariffs only release small
quantities of water from agriculture for other uses, at a high cost
to the irrigation sector as farm incomes drop significantly (Per-
ry 2001, Berbel 2000, Rosegrant 2000, Löfgren 1996). In addi-
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tion, in existing irrigation systems, prevailing, formal or infor-
mal, water rights significantly increase the value of irrigated
land. Water rights holders correctly perceive the imposition of
water prices, or an increase in existing prices, as expropriation
of those rights, reducing the value of land in established irriga-
tion farms. Attempts to establish or increase water prices are
thus met with strong opposition from irrigators (Rosegrant
1994). Moreover, current water fees are generally low – limiting
the potential for water savings. When water fees increase, ad-
verse impacts on farmer incomes can be large. However, water
fees can work well if they are implemented appropriately. Wa-
ter pricing helps to maximize social welfare by creating incen-
tives to move water to the most productive uses, while less pro-
ductive applications reduce water use.
An analysis in the Brantas basin in Indonesia revealed water
values ranging from 0.02 to 0.11 Dollar per cubic meter while
the full water supply cost was 0.006 Dollar per cubic meter and
water fees ranged from 4.5 to 13.3 Dollar per hectare or 0.001
Dollar per cubic meter (Rodgers 2005). A river basin model ana-
lysis for the Dong Nai River showed that under increasing irri-
gation service fees, both area and yield for lower-value crops de-
cline rapidly, translating into sharp declines in farmer incomes,
while water withdrawals are reduced more slowly, and water sa-
vings concomitantly are small (Ringler 2005).
Water Trading in River Basins
The implementation of water use rights together with a bro-
kerage mechanisms or market clearing mechanism at the basin
scale, on the other hand, can protect farmer incomes while sa-
ving water and supporting water moving into higher-value uses.
This will be examined based on three alternative model scena-
rios using the basin model introduced previously for the Dong
Nai River basin in southern Vietnam. Under the Water Use
Rights (WRI) scenario, water use rights are allocated to all wa-
ter-using sectors following historic usage. In the brokerage me-
chanism or clearinghouse scenario (CH), individual water de-
mand sites can sell unused or purchase additional water use
Rights from an agency at the fixed price of 0.02 Dollar and 0.06
Dollar per cubic meter every month. Under the Market Clearing
(MC) scenario, in addition, the volume of water use rights sold
and bought need to equal.
Under the clearinghouse mechanism, all water-using sectors
in the Dong Nai River basin are net buyers of water when the
water price is set at 0.02 Dollar per cubic meter, and a total of
1690 million cubic meters are traded providing the agency a net
income of 34 million Dollar from water sales for the river basin
as a whole (see Figure 2). At the same time, gross irrigation with-
drawals increase to 8.7 cubic kilometer. On the other hand, be-
nefits to instream uses like hydropower and environmental uses
decline, as they do not have water use rights accorded based on
the water law. Moreover, although total profits in the irrigation
sector increase, these profits are spread over a much wider irri-
gation area, and more low-value, water-intensive crops are
brought into production. As a result, profits decline on a per hec-
tare basis compared to the system with fixed water rights from
591 Dollar per hectare to 538 Dollar per hectare. If the water pri-
ce in the CH mechanism is set at a higher level, here 0.06 Dol-
lar per cubic meter, it is more profitable for many irrigation sys-
tems to sell part of their water use right to the water agency than
to continue using the full share of allocated use rights. Due to
the large sales of water out of irrigated agriculture, the volume
of gross agricultural water withdrawals declines to 3.1 cubic ki-
lometer and irrigated area drops to 0.497 million hectares. As a
result, profits from irrigated agriculture alone under the higher
water price of 0.06 Dollar per cubic meter are lower compared
to the irrigation profits at the agency-set price of 0.02 Dollar per
cubic meter. However, the important result is that under the hig-
her water price, profit from irrigated agriculture on a per hecta-
re basis is with 779 Dollar per hectar significantly higher com-
pared to the WRI scenario with 591 Dollar per hectar and the
CH scenario at the lower agency-set price with 538 Dollar per
hectar. At the price offered for the water use right, irrigating far-
mers make a substantial share of their use rights available to ot-
her off-stream users or the environment, while investing their
remaining water resources into crops that are more profitable
per cubic meter of water. Thus, water moves to higher-valued
uses without income losses to the irrigation sector.
In addition to the brokerage mechanism a market clearing
mechanism can be introduced under which net purchases of
water need to equal net sales. This ensures that instream water
Source: Developed by author
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Figure 2: Clearinghouse and Market Clearing Scenarios – 
Water Sales/Purchase and Agency Income/Cost
„Increased irrigation service fees would 
impose a substantial burden on farm 
economic welfare, while water savings 
would be relatively modest.“
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uses are not significantly harmed through large additional wa-
ter withdrawals. Under this MC scenario, consequently the vo-
lume of purchases and sales drops compared to the CH scena-
rios. At the water price of 0.02 Dollar per cubic meter, irrigation
demand sites are unable to purchase water as domestic and in-
dustrial sectors themselves strive to purchase water from lower-
value irrigation. At the higher water price, trade is even more li-
mited, as domestic and industrial sectors purchase less water
than the irrigation sector might be willing to free up at this pri-
ce. While the quantity of water traded was 1690 MCM under
BRK 0.02 Dollar and 1485 MCM under BRK 0.06 Dollar, the cor-
responding volumes under the market clearing mechanism
drop to 284 MCM under MC 0.02 Dollar and 275 MCM under
MC 0.06 Dollar, respectively. Although net farm income per hec-
tare under market clearing does not reach brokerage mecha-
nism levels – at which the agency supports water sales from ir-
rigated areas even if no one purchases this water – net profits
per hectare irrigated are still greater than under the WRI case.
Conclusion
The implementation of economic incentives depends on the
socioeconomic, institutional, physical, and political conditions
at the site. And on the relationship between property and pri-
cing regimes, and on the level of transaction costs. Results from
many case studies show that increased irrigation service fees
would impose a substantial burden on farm economic welfare,
while water savings at the basin level would be relatively mo-
dest. Simple water trading instruments, including a clearing-
house mechanism, and informal or formal water marketing, on
the other hand, can induce conservation of water while main-
taining farmer incomes. Issues to contemplate during the im-
plementation of a brokerage mechanism include: (a) third-par-
ty effects including impacts on the quantity or quality of return
flows or reduced economic activity in the water-supplying re-
gion, (b) the difficulty of trading water over long distances, (c)
the potential for monopoly control over water resources, and (d)
the danger of over-exploitation of open-access water resources
such as groundwater.
However, despite the beneficial outcomes presented here for
a river basin in southern Vietnam for both the irrigation sector
and the overall basin economy, economic incentive approaches
outside of irrigation service fee payments have seldom been im-
plemented. Such implementation would require (a) strong wa-
ter use rights systems, (b) careful fitting of instruments to the
particular water use and development situation and (c) pilot tes-
ting at a smaller scale before attempting large-scale implemen-
tation. Much work remains to be done in this area. Important
new research areas for economic incentives include their appli-
cation for water quality control in a river basin context, the as-
sessment of distributional impacts of economic incentives by
income class and gender and the linkage of basin-level econo-
mic incentives with computable general equilibrium models to
assess economy-wide impacts of changing basin water alloca-
tions. Also further analysis of the impacts of input and output
price support and trade policies on basin water allocation and
use as well as research into the political economy of the policy
adoption process of economic incentives is needed.
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